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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3221 
_____________ 
 
JOSEPH LYNCH, 
 
                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MATTHEWS INTERNATIONAL, Successor in interest to other IDL WORLDWIDE, 
INC.;  TIM CIOCCIO, an individual; JOHN MAZOK, an individual;  
STEVE MILLER, an individual 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01717) 
Magistrate Judge:  Hon. Amy Reynolds Hay  
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 11, 2011 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 3, 2011) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
 The parties consented to trying the case before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c)(1). 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Joseph Lynch appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Matthews International.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite 
the facts.  Prior to beginning work for Matthews International, Lynch suffered an injury 
to his left foot that required monthly nerve block injections.  So long as he received these 
injections, Lynch was not limited in any major life activity.  When he began his 
employment at Matthews International, Lynch worked the second shift, allowing him to 
continue to receive these injections without any accommodation from his employer.  
Following a transfer to a facility that did not have a second shift, Lynch was permitted to 
miss work to receive the injections, but was required to use sick or vacation time to do so.  
Lynch was terminated in 2007, allegedly because of a reduction in force, although Lynch 
maintains that it was due to his regular need for time off to receive the nerve block 
injections. 
 Lynch filed suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the 
defendants had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act.  The District Court granted summary judgment on all counts 
following the defendants’ motion.  On appeal, Lynch challenges only the grant of 
summary judgment as to his ADA claim against Matthews International, and specifically 
the District Court’s conclusion that he was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 
3 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
grant of summary judgment.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, 
an individual must show that “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; 
(2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) he has 
suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”  Gaul 
v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).  To establish a qualifying disability, 
the plaintiff must show either that he has “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities,” or that he has a record of such an 
impairment or is regarded by his employer as having such an impairment.  42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2) (2008).   
Lynch’s argument is brief and straightforward:  discrimination against an 
individual because of the measures taken to mitigate a physical impairment must 
constitute disability discrimination under the ADA.  Lynch recognizes that this case is 
controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 
471 (1999).
1
  In that case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that for purposes of 
establishing whether an individual has an impairment that substantially limits a  major 
                                              
1
 We note that with the passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Sutton would not 
be controlling if the conduct occurred today.  Sutton did, however, provide the relevant 
law at the time that the complained-of conduct occurred in this case. 
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life activity, courts must consider mitigating measures taken by the individual to correct 
the impairment; if, with mitigating measures, the impairment no longer substantially 
affects a major life activity, the individual would not qualify as disabled under the ADA.  
Id. at 482-83.  Applying that precedent to the present case, the District Court concluded 
that Lynch could not bring suit under the ADA, because his mitigating measures were 
successful enough that he was not substantially limited in a major life activity.  Although 
citing no cases, Lynch states simply that “it is fundamentally unfair to permit an 
employer to rely on these mitigating measures to deny that an employee has a disability, 
while terminating the employee for seeking those same mitigating measures.”  Lynch’s 
Br. at 5. 
While we agree with Lynch that such a system is, perhaps, less than ideal, it is the 
statutory framework that was in place at the time that Lynch suffered his adverse 
employment action.  Our first step in analyzing a claim under the ADA is to determine 
whether the individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA.  See Taylor v. Phoenixville 
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1999).  In the present case, Lynch does not 
contest that he was taking mitigating measures that resulted in his not being substantially 
limited in a major life activity.  Further, he does not assert that he was discriminated 
against because he was regarded as having a disability or because of a record of having a 
disability; instead, he argues that he was discriminated against because he took mitigating 
measures to prevent himself from having a disability.  Unfortunately, at the time that any 
such conduct occurred, it was not prohibited by the ADA.  Because Lynch was not 
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disabled within the meaning of the ADA, he could not bring suit under that Act, and the 
District Court acted properly in granting summary judgment. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
